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B A R L O W UPHOLSTERY & FURNI-
TURE COMPANY, a partnership; JAY 
B A I L E Y , dba BAILEY'S HOME 
FURNISHINGS; EDWARDS FURNI-
TURE, INC., a corporation; EL-
DREDGE FURNITURE CO., INC., a 
corporation; EARL'S HOME FURN-
ISHINGS, INC., a corporation; LAKE-
WOODS HOME FURNISHINGS, INC., 
a corporation; M A Y E R S E G A L ; 
TRIBE'S HOME FURNITURE & CAR-
PET CO., INC., a corporation; VAN 
KAMPEN & SONS, INC., a corpora-
tion; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC 
CORPORATION, a corporation; WIL-
LIAM DAVIS, dba DAVIS FURNI-
TURE COMPANY; and PRICE TRAD-
ING CO., a corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
W I L L I A M EMMEL dba NOYCE 
TRANSFER & WAREHOUSE CO., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs-appellants are dealers in furniture and ap-
pliances, whose merchandis was destroyed by fire while 
Case No. 
13640 
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in defendant's warehouse. The claims of two of the 
plaintiffs were based upon common carrier liability and 
the claims of all plaintiffs were based upon negligence of 
a bailee or warehouseman. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff Eldredge on common carrier liability; 
granted summary judgment against plaintiff Westing-
house on the issue of common carrier liability; and the 
jury returned a verdict against plaintiffs on the issue of 
negligence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Westinghouse seeks an order directing 
judgment in its favor on the common carrier liability 
issue. All appellants request the court to rule that the 
defendant was negligent as a matter of law and direct 
judgment in favor of the appellants or in the alternative, 
to grant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs, other than Westinghouse, are dealers 
in furniture and appliances who pool their orders from 
some manufacturers to avail themselves of carload ship-
ping rates and this arrangement requires a central re-
ceiving agent to receive the car and distribute i t among 
the participants. In 1969 William Emmel acquired the 
Noyce Transfer & Warehouse Company from Jack Noyce 
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who had operated the business for some thirty years (R. 
229) and most of the plaintiffs had for many years used 
the company as the agent for receiving the pool cans or 
trucks for redistribution (R. 236). As the cars arrived 
they were unloaded directly into the warehouse, sepa-
rately stacked in original shipping cartons for each custo-
mer, and a notification was sent to the out of town con-
signee who would pick it up, usually after two to seven 
days (R. 247-250). Emmel also held a Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity issued by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah to operate as a common carrier by motor 
vehicle for Salt Lake City and parts of Davis County 
(R. 249, Exhibit 1-P) which enabled him to deliver to 
or for customers in the area of his franchise. 
The warehouse building which was destroyed by fire 
consisted of 30,000 square feet constructed of concrete 
block walls, wooden paneled doors, (R. 232), tar and 
gravel roof (R. 205), ooncerete floors, and had been 
constructed in three contiguous sections over a period 
of years (R. 231). There were manual fire extinguishers 
(R. 241), but no automatic sprinklers (R. 242), fire 
alarms or night watchmen (R. 243). 
On Friday, July 21, Emmel personally closed the 
warehouse (R. 244), did not return again on the long 
weekend and found out about the fire from a friend who 
called him at 11:30 P.M. (R. 245), on Monday, July 24; 
it took him 20 minutes to come from his home, 2820 East 
4135 South, near Olympus High School, (R. 258) and 
when he arrived at the warehouse "There wasn't any-
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
thing left" (R. 245). There were no signs on the premises 
as to whom to notify in case of emergency (R. 259). The 
fire department received the alarm at 10:49 P.M. July 
24, 1972 (R. 199), and the fire investigator testified that 
the building was totally burned inside the warehouse 
area (R. 201); that the point of origin was placed in the 
central part of the building at the electrical switch boxes 
which were the main electrical supply source for the 
building (R. 208 and R. 217); that there was no evidence 
of arson (R. 209) and that it was finally classified as a 
fire of undetermined cause (R. 216). The investigator 
stated that at the time of his investigation the electrical 
appliances in use in the building had already been re-
moved so that he did not inspect them (R. 219). The 
city electrical inspector was called to investigate the 
elctrical aspects of the fire on July 26, 1972 at 2:00 P.M. 
(R. 308) and he also did not see the appliances which 
were in use (R. 309), but he did see and save the main 
switch box and the remains of the cylinder-type 100 amp 
fuse cartridge which showed that the replaceable fuse 
element had been replaced or refused with two strands 
of Number 16 or 18 copper wire instead of the alloy 
usually used as a fuse (R. 310-311). Chidester, the elec-
trical inspector, stated that coming out of the main switch 
box which housed the modified 100 am fuses were certain 
wires of which the No. 4 wire fed a switch breaker (R. 
318) which acts as a reduced capacity fuse, but there 
were also two No. 8 wires which appeared to by-pass the 
switch breaker to feed some other unit and a 40 amp 
fuse is designed to protect No. 8 wire (R. 326). Chides-
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ter could not find any fuse protecting the No. 8 wire other 
than the two cartridge fuses which were rated up to 100 
amps each if fitted with the approved fuse element rather 
than pieces of copper wire (JR. 335). Chidester stated 
that if a short circuit be created at an appliance which 
should be protected by something less than 60 amps, but 
in fact was protected by a device which would allow up 
to 250 amps, it would create heat (R. 349) and the 
puipose of an approved fuse is to prevent overheating 
of the wire to prevent burning of the insulation which 
could cause a fire ( R 350). 
Joseph C. Fackrell was called by the plaintiffs as 
an expert electrical engineer and he testified that he cali-
brated the wire in the fuse cartridges which constituted 
the improvised fuse and found the wire in the fuse to be 
No. 18. He stated by way of example that with a 150 amp 
load, a 45 amp renewable link would melt in about three-
tenths of a second, whereas a No. 18 wire would never 
melt (R. 362). He said the two No. 8 wires referred to 
by Chidester as being protected only by the improvised 
fuses would normally require a 40 amp bimker to protect 
them and the use of No. 18 wire as a fuse could cause 
the No. 8 wire insulation to burn and result in a fire (R. 
368-369) as found by him in a test using 160 amps and 
at the end of one minute an odor emanated; at the end 
of two minutes it started to smoke and after two and 
one-half minutes the test device was turned off because 
the insulation began to melt and bubble (R. 369). 
Mr. Emmel was recalled to testify and stated that 
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150 amps and having two improvised fuses would in effect 
allow up to 150 amps in each (R. 398) and that there 
should have been other adequate fuses to protect the No. 
8 wire (R.402). 
On motion for new trial, plaintiffs offered to show 
newly discovered evidence from Jack Noyce, the previous 
owner of the premises who was out of state at the time 
of the trial, that the fuses were never improvised during 
the time he occupied the premises to the date of sale 
and transfer to the defendant Emmel (R. 22). 
Emmel testified that he had taped the switch break-
ers which fed the front offices in the on position so that 
they would not be turned off by people using the switch 
breaker box for other power in the building (R. 240). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS A COMMON CAR-
RIER FOR WESTINGHOUSE AND AS 
SUCH WAS AN INSURER AGAINST DAM-
AGE FROM FIRE NOT CAUSED BY ACT 
OF GOD. 
The relationship of the defendant as a common car-
The relationship of the defendant as a common car-
rier for Westinghouse is established by the testimony of 
the defendant and Mr. Whittemore, operations manager 
for Westinghouse plant sales. 
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Comment 6. We now quote the first four sentences of 
said Comment 6: 
"[6] A checkroom business is no part of the 
business of a common carrier and when it acts in 
that capacity it is acting as a warehouseman. Al-
though the court found that appellant was in 
Portland, Oregon and enroute to Pocatello, Idaho 
at the time he checked the bag and contents at 
respondent's parcel room, the hag was not in 
interstate commerce. He paid for checking it 
there just as he would have done were he not 
traveling and merely intended to store it for a 
period of time. The transaction was not con-
nected, as far as the bailee was concerned, with 
the fact that he intended to travel from Pbrtland 
to Pocatello." 
In the instant case the evidence was that five of the 
invoices were for immediate delivery to the named con-
signees and one, a freezer, invoiced at $220.00 was a will-
call item (R. 189-190). In his sworn testimony Emmel 
stated that he had not made any calls to the consignees 
and had not been advised by any of the consignees to 
hold the merchandise (R. 196). He further stated that 
on Friday he removed the merchandise from one car for 
his own convenience (R. 261) and the car to which he 
had reference contained 23 refrigerators and 21 ranges 
of the invoice value of $5,118.02. 
The following is a tabulation of the information in 
connection with the five invoices of Westinghouse (Ex. 
P-13 and R. 173-176): 
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Invoice No. 985286 
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Date Shipped 7-18 
Car No UP 520076 
£ U *
 7.207:<^ M. 7.U7:«»A£ 
Amount $5,118.^ * 
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The defendant had two warehousemen and two truck-
drivers as his employees (R. 259), one of these employ-
ees, the foreman, was on vacation, for two weeks prior 
to the fire (R. 282), and this was a busy time of the 
year (R. 260), all of which supports the conclusion that 
the merchandise was retained by the defendant for his 
own convenience until he could find time to make the 
delivery and was not being held for storage for the plain-
tiff. Neither of the parties ever considered the relation-
ship to be other than that of a contract for carriage and 
it was only on certain rare occasions that the defendant 
would call and be requested by the consignee to hold the 
merchandise, in which case there would be a separate 
arrangement for storage charge specifically changing the 
relationship from carrier to warehouseman. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT AS A BAILEE-WAREHOUSE-
MAN HAD THE BURDEN OF SHOWING 
THAT THE FIRE WAS NOT DUE TO HIS 
NEGLIGENCE. 
A. CASES ON BURDEN OF PROOF. 
B. CASES ON FAILURE OF INSPECTION 
AS NEGLIGENCE. 
Notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, we argue 
as a matter of law that the defendant as a bailee has the 
duty of showing that the loss or damage is not due to 
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his negligence and that leaving the premises for three 
days without inspection is negligence as a matter of law. 
There was no evidence that the defendant exercised 
reasonable care in at least the particular of leaving the 
warehouse without an inspector or night watchman or 
any inspection from Friday evening through Monday 
evening (R. 245) knowing that the following conditions 
existed: 
(a) His warehouse was full of expensive, combusti-
ble merchandise belonging to bailors for hire. 
(b) The warehouse was remotely located at 736 
West on 3rd South which is not a through street or exten-
sively traveled on weekends. 
(c) No signs on the premises showed who to con-
tact in emergency and in fact there was difficulty in find-
ing who owned the premises (R. 259). 
(d) The defendant lived in Holladay at 2820 East 
4135 South which was twenty minutes from the ware-
house by freeway (R. 258). 
(e) No sprinkling system for fire protection existed 
(R. 242) and only manual fire extinguishers were avail-
able requiring personnel present for the operation thereof 
(R. 241). 
(f) There were no security guards (R. 243). 
A. CASES ON BURDEN OF PROOF. 
We review two decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
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regarding the liability of bailees and burden of proof. In 
the case of Clack-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling Aircraft, 
Inc., 17 U. 2d 245, 408 P. 2d 904 (1965), the plaintiff flier 
had left an airplane with the defendant one afternoon. 
An unusual breeze of 95 mph came up and destroyed the 
aircraft. The trial court instructed the jury that the 
plaintiff had the burden to prove negligence of the de-
fendant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff which was affirmed on appeal but the court held that 
the plaintiff did not have the burden of proof. Quoting 
from the decision: 
"The plaintiff brought its airplane to defendant's 
old Salt Lake City airport and left it with the 
defendant as a bailee for hire for about a day. 
Under these circumstances the defendant, as the 
bailee, had the burden of proving that the de-
struction of the airplane was not caused by his 
negligence and the plaintiff did not have the 
burden of proving that the defendant was guilty 
of negligence which proximately caused the de-
struction of the airplane and the other property." 
The appellate court further indicated that the defendant 
had been given a more favorable instruction than it was 
entitled to in that "it placed the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff bailor instead of on the defendant bailee." 
Another Utah case, Romney v. Covey Garage, 100 
U. 167, 111 P. 2d 545, was where the plaintiff had left his 
car at the defendant's garage with the keys in it for stor-
age. Two thieves stole it and while being chased by the 
defendant's employee, the car was wrecked. The jury 
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returned the verdict for the plaintiff and in affirming the 
verdict Justice Wolfe stated that if the plaintiff shows: 
(1) bailment and (2) failure to return or damage to the 
bailed chattels, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case. 
The court states that while a majority of cases say that 
if the loss results by fire or theft, which on its face does 
not disclose negligence by the bailee, the bailee over-
comes the presumption of negligence but Utah adopts 
the rule of numerous other cases and we quote from 
Comment 4: 
"But, on the other hand theore are numerous 
cases which hold that after bailor proves the 
bailment and the damage or loss, the burden is 
on the bailee to show that the damage or loss 
was not due to his negligence and he stands the 
risk of non-persuasion on this point." 
B. CASES ON FAILURE OF INSPECTION 
AS NEGLIGENCE. 
There are cases from other jurisdictions which indi-
cate that the failure to have a night watchman or inspec-
tor on for a period of time is negligence and sometimes 
is negligence as a matter of law. 
In the case of Hanson, et al. v. Wells Van & Storage 
Co., et at., (Calif. 223 P. 2d 509), the plaintiff's house-
hold goods were destroyed by fire while stored in de-
fendant's warehouse. It was admitted by the defendant 
that the burden of proof that the fire was not proximately 
caused by the defendant's negligence was on the defen-
dant. (George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal. 2d 
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834, 839-841, 205 P. 2d 1037). The defendant introduced 
evidence of the type and construction of the warehouse, 
the place and manner of storage, the precautions em-
ployed and an expert from the fire department who testi-
fied that he could not determine the cause of the fire 
either by negligence or criminal act. The trial court 
found the defendant failed to prove that the fire was 
caused without fault or negligence and that the evidence 
showed affirmatively that the defendant left the top 
floor uninspected for a period of almost two days prior 
to the fire. The judgment was affirmed on appeal and 
quoting from the George case the court stated: 
"Defendant cannot explain the fire and the fact 
that it enforced rigid rules to prevent fire does 
not preclude as a matter of law of finding that 
it was at least as probable that the fire was 
caused by negligence on the part of the defen-
dant or its employees as by a cause for which 
the defendant would not be legally responsible." 
At Comment 3 the court stated: 
"The fact that the cause of fire is unknown is 
not sufficient to support appellant's burden of 
proof of due care." 
Then in Comment 5 the court stated that the finding 
that the defendant was negligent in leaving the floor of 
the building where the fire broke out uninspected for two 
days is supported by the evidence. 
Denman Warehouse Co., et al. v. Kirby Widener, 
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et at., U. S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit (1949), 172 
F. 2d 910, 13 A. L. R. 2d 669, was a case in which a de-
fendant warehouseman subject to the provisions of the 
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act was sued for refusal 
to redeliver goods bailed which were destroyed by fire 
of unknown origin. At the trial the burden of showing 
due care was placed on the defendant. The jury found 
thai the defendant failed to use ordinary care as a bailee 
specifically in (1) failing to have a night watchman; (2) 
permitting the accumulation of inflammable trash; and 
(3) permitting smoking in the place of storage and that 
such acts were the proximate cause of the fire. On ap-
peal the judgment was affirmed, Judge Murrah, writing 
the opinion, held that the Uniform Warehouse Receipts 
Act places the burden of proof of due care upon the 
warehouseman. That the jury could find negligence in 
not having a nightwatchman on duty even though not 
the custom in the industry or in the previous operation 
of this business and that the jury could find negligence 
from allowing debris to collect and allowing smoking. 
That the proximate cause is a permissible inference from 
these acts as found. 
The investigator for the Salt Lake City Fire Depart-
ment listed the cause of fire in this case as "undeter-
mined" (R. 216), but he ruled out arson (R. 209) and 
indicated that from the intensity of the fire in the central 
part of the building by the electrical switch-box, he placed 
the point of origin at the switch-box (R. 208 and R. 225). 
All the appliances which had been in use on the premises 
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had been removed before the investigator arrived (R. 
219) and before the electrical inspector could examine 
them to determine if they were connected with the cause 
of the fire (R. 308-309). Under these circumstances, the 
defendant, who had control and responsibiUty for the 
items which were suspected of the cause, should have 
presented evidence of their condition to prove there was 
no negligence in connection with the use or involvement 
of these appliances. This becomes especially important 
in that the defendant, when asked what appliances were 
in use on the premises, did not mention the electric 
range nor the electric typewriters (R. 268), but his em-
ployee testified that there was an electric range and two 
electric typewriters in use (R. 298 and R. 300). In view 
of the improvised fuse wires and the expert testimony 
that a short in an appliance can gradually heat other 
wires and eventually cause a fire if not properly fused, 
the electrical appliances should have been seriously sus-
pected. No evidence was presented by the defendant 
to exclude the suspected electrical causes of fire or negli-
gence in connection therewith. 
CONCLUSION 
There should be little doubt that Westinghouse is 
entitled to summary judgment in its favor by reason of 
the common carrier status and certainly was not deserv-
ing of a summary judgment against it on this issue. 
As to the warehouseman status and the issue of neg-
ligence, a jury should not be allowed to make a finding 
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of no negligence on the issue of failure to inspect for 
three days where other jurisdictions find this to be negli-
gence as a matter of law. The ultimate finding of the 
jury is oontrary to the evidence and the law and may 
have been influenced by a protective attitude. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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